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Is corporate governance ineffective in emerging markets? On both sides of the question, anecdotes abound. On one side: Fotex, a Hungarian firm, issued convertible bonds on favorable terms to its large shareholder, who is also its CEO. Minority shareholders' stakes were diluted.
On the other side: the CEO of Enersis, a Chilean utility, was forced to resign in 1997 after it was revealed that a planned merger of Enersis with a Spanish utility involved $500 million in payments to the CEO and 13 of his closest colleagues. Since dueling anecdotes are unlikely to 1 convince a sceptic one way or the other, this paper uses cross-sectional data on over 1,200 emerging market firms to investigate whether corporate governance is ineffective in emerging markets.
This paper aims to expand our knowledge of how well the financial systems in emerging markets work. One of the paper's goals is to help investors in emerging markets better understand the risks they face. Investment by developed country investors in emerging markets has grown dramatically in the 1990s. Emerging markets have liberalized, allowing foreign investors greater access. Emerging equity markets have been shown to offer high expected returns and low correlations with each other and with developed equity markets, making them attractive to global investors seeking diversification (Divecha, Drach, and Stefek 1992; Harvey 1995) .
Investments have flowed into emerging markets even though emerging markets have not been studied as intensively as developed markets. Corporate governance is no exception. As See Chung and Kim (1999) on Korea for one example. Wolfensohn, president of the World Bank, has argued that "weak governance was one of several factors contributing to the crisis" (Wolfensohn 1999) . In looking for policies to reduce the risk of future crises, a group of international policymakers argued that it is "essential to develop sets of sound practice in the area of corporate governance" (Report of the Working Group on Strengthening Financial Systems 1998, p. vi). Policymakers are developing codes of good corporate governance practices to help prevent future crises (they hope). But others, such as Radelet and Sachs (1998) , reject attempts to blame corporate governance for the financial crisis.
They focus instead on the use of short-term debt and poor risk management by emerging market countries, and on the volatility of short-term capital flows. A second goal of this paper is to provide some evidence on the validity of the charge that weak corporate governance contributed to the global financial crisis.
A few studies have examined corporate governance in emerging markets, although none has estimated the link between CEO turnover and corporate performance that is the focus of this paper. Researchers have studied the implications of the concentrated corporate ownership that is 3 common in many emerging and developed markets. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and study 27 countries and conclude that "the principal agency problem in large corporations around the world is that of restricting expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders. " Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (1999) identify the ownership structure of firms in nine East Asian countries, including four of the emerging markets studied in this paper. They conclude that the main corporate governance problem in these countries is the expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders. Both sets of authors carefully trace through pyramidal shareholding structures to identify a firm's ultimate owners.
Three recent papers study corporate governance in India. Khanna and Palepu (1999) and Sarkar and Sarkar (1998) examine how the identity of the immediate owners of Indian firms is correlated with the firms' valuation, as measured by a market-to-book ratio. Chhibber and Majumdar (1999) examine how ownership characteristics of Indian firms affect profitability.
Because these authors look at immediate ownership, not ultimate ownership, it is hard to compare their results with the two papers mentioned above. A common result across the three Indian papers is that high foreign ownership has beneficial effects (either on market valuation or profitability). Djankov (1999a, 1999b ) study corporate governance in transition economies. Using data on recently privatized firms in the Czech Republic, they find that firms with concentrated ownership, foreign ownership, and ownership by non-bank investment funds are more profitable and have higher labor productivity. They also find that CEO turnover is followed by improvement in profitability and labor productivity. These effects are stronger when the new CEO is appointed by a private owner, rather than the government.
See Shleifer and Vishny's (1997) survey. Most of these papers focus on concentrated ownership, which can be described as a corporate governance mechanism. Corporate governance mechanisms are ways to deal with the agency problems between managers and shareholders and between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Corporate governance mechanisms aim to ensure that minority shareholders' rights are not usurped, managers' actions are monitored, and poorly performing managers are replaced. Studies of corporate governance mechanisms for U.S. firms are common and look at a wider range of mechanisms than the nascent literature on emerging markets has yet taken on. Boards of directors, institutional investor activism, hostile takeovers, and executive compensation schemes are common topics. However, inferring the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the performance of a corporate governance "system" is problematic. The various mechanisms can substitute for one another. For example, La Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) show that in countries where the legal system does not do a good job of protecting shareholders' rights, concentrated ownership is more prevalent.
Because I am interested in evaluating the performance of corporate governance in emerging markets, I focus on corporate governance outcomes rather than corporate governance mechanisms. Specifically, I look at the relationship between CEO turnover and corporate performance. A necessary condition for an effective corporate governance system is that poorly performing managers are replaced, as Macey (1997) suggests. I assess whether this condition holds in emerging markets.
A number of papers study the relationship between CEO turnover and corporate 4 performance in a single country. For the U.S., recent examples are Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) and Parrino (1997) . For Japan, see Kang and Shivdasani (1995) and Abe (1997) .
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Such an approach was taken by Kaplan (1994a Kaplan ( , 1994b Kaplan ( , 1997 , studying corporate governance in the U.S., Germany, and Japan. Some researchers had argued that one or the other corporate governance system was superior. Kaplan showed that firms in the three countries exhibit broadly similar relationships between CEO turnover and corporate performance. Poor performance made a manager more likely to be replaced in all three. Along one important dimension, the corporate governance outcomes in different countries were similar, although the corporate governance mechanisms in each country were and are quite different. 4 While a relationship between CEO turnover and corporate performance may be a necessary feature of a corporate governance system that "works," it is not sufficient. Other factors need to be in place for a corporate governance system to work well. For example, a market for corporate control is needed to deal with times when everyday monitoring is not adequate. Looking for a relationship between CEO turnover and corporate performance tests whether corporate governance is ineffective. Such a relationship, on its own, cannot prove the contrary, that corporate governance is effective. I estimate the relationship between CEO turnover and corporate performance for emerging market firms:
Prob{CEO turnover} = f(firm performance, other control variables)
I test whether there is a negative relationship between the probability of CEO turnover and firm performance. Since CEO turnover is a binary variable, I choose to estimate the following logit regression:
Prob{CEO turnover} = f( firm performance + NZ)
where captures the relationship I am interested in, is a k×1 vector of coefficients, Z is a k×1 vector of other control variables (indicator variables for year, country, and industry), and f(@) is the logistic function f(a) = e /(1+e ). a a
To preview the results, I find that poor corporate performance increases the probability of CEO turnover among my sample of emerging market firms. affect the probability of CEO turnover such as the CEO's age and tenure at the firm. It is plausible to argue that these unobserved characteristics are uncorrelated with firm performance.
If so, their absence will worsen the fit of the regression models but should not bias the coefficient on firm performance. Summary statistics on CEO turnover in emerging markets are presented in Table 2 .
I use five measures of firm performance common in the literature: earnings scaled by assets, change in earnings scaled by lagged assets, an indicator variable for positive earnings, stock market return, and growth in sales. The measure of earnings is EBIT, earnings before I tried adding lagged performance to the regressions but it was always statistically 7 insignificant.
9 interest and taxes. The positive earnings indicator variable is intended to capture the effects of financial distress. Stock market return is total return on the firm's equity in excess of the return on a market index for the firm's country. All five performance measures are measured over the firm's fiscal year, as is CEO turnover. Table 3 contains summary statistics on the five 7 performance measures.
All but the stock market return rely on accounting data to some extent, and accounting data in emerging markets have flaws. While Worldscope claims to standardize and clean the firm-level financial data when adding it to their database, problems of non-comparable accounting standards across countries will always be present. I hope I have minimized their effect by choosing relatively simple measures of firm performance that do not demand too much from the accounting data. If corporate performance has random mismeasurement added in due to poor accounting standards, it should bias the coefficient on performance toward zero, making it harder to find an effect of performance on CEO turnover.
To get a sense of the quality of accounting standards in the eight emerging market countries in the sample, I consulted the rating of accounting standards constructed by the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research which was used by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) . A country's accounting standards are rated by examining the extent of disclosures made in the financial statements of a few listed firms. The mean rating across the eight emerging market countries is 61, identical to the mean for all 41 countries reported in La
The ratings, taken from Regression results I estimate the logit regression described above for each of the five firm performance measures individually. Results are in Table 4 . For all five performance measures, poor performance is associated with higher CEO turnover. For the three earnings-based measures and for sales growth, the link is statistically significantly different from zero (using a 5 percent onetailed test). The link between stock market return and CEO turnover is not significant (the pvalue of the one-tailed test is .054). All five pass the logit regression goodness-of-fit test of Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) . I chose not to omit these two outliers because the extreme performance that led them to 11 be outliers was not a data error. If they had been omitted, the coefficient on earnings/assets in Table 4 would be !2.1 with a t-statistic of !3.2, and the coefficient on earnings/assets would be 11
The change in the predicted probability of CEO turnover for any change in performance can be read off the appropriate graph. For example, using the top left graph, for a firm that falls from the median of earnings/assets to the 5 percentile, the probability of CEO turnover would th rise from 11.2 percent to 13.2 percent, an 18% increase. Only the four performance measures that are continuous variables are included in the figure. For positive earnings, which is an indicator variable, the predicted probability of CEO turnover rises from 10.6 percent at firms with positive earnings to 17.3 percent at firms with negative earnings, a 63% increase.
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The regressions passed four robustness checks, to outliers, nonlinearities, the choice of which emerging markets to include in the data sample, and the inclusion of firm size effects. To 10 look for influential outliers, I computed the "influence statistics" of Pregibon (1981) . Any observation whose deletion from the sample would change the regression coefficient on a performance variable by more than one-half of the coefficient's standard error was flagged for investigation. Four observations were flagged by this test; upon investigation two were revealed to be data errors and were dropped from the sample. The other two were not data errors and were left in. One had a large jump in earnings and a change in CEO. The other had very low earnings and no change in CEO. Omitting them would strengthen the estimated effect of performance on CEO turnover.
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!1.9 with a t-statistic of !2.6. Other coefficients are not appreciably affected.
There were no significant differences in CEO turnover rates among the other three size 12 quartiles.
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To check for nonlinearities in the relationship between performance and CEO turnover, I
re-estimated the logit regression allowing the effect of performance on CEO turnover to be piecewise linear. Over several different specifications of the piecewise linearity with several different choices for the "knots," the nonlinearity was never statistically significant.
To see if the results were unduly influenced by the choice of which emerging markets to include, I dropped all firms for one emerging market at a time and re-estimated the logit regressions on the remaining seven emerging markets. Earnings/assets and positive earnings had the most robust associations with CEO turnover, as their t-statistics were less than -2 for all eight sets of seven emerging markets. The t-statistics for the change in earnings and for sales growth were less robust but were always less than -1.5. The t-statistics for stock market return, which was not significant in the regression with all eight emerging markets, ranged from -1.2 to -2.1.
An alternative explanation for the link between CEO turnover and firm performance is that both are correlated with firm size, which is omitted from the regression. If this were true, the regression results would merely reflect an omitted variable bias, not a true causal relationship. To investigate this alternative, I divide firms into four size quartiles according to their total assets measured in U.S. dollars at the end of the fiscal year. firm size and performance suggests that omitted variable bias is not why poor firm performance is associated with higher CEO turnover.
Regression tests confirm that omitted variable bias is not driving the results. When dummy variables for size quartiles are added to the regression, the smallest size quartile has a significantly lower probability of CEO turnover than the other three size quartiles. However, the coefficients on firm performance are little changed from those reported in Table 4 . When the size quartile dummy variables are interacted with the performance variables, to see if the relationship between CEO turnover and performance is different for different size firms, the interaction terms are never statistically significant.
Regression results: multiple performance measures
Since the performance measures are correlated with one another, it is possible that some of the associations between individual performance measures and CEO turnover shown in Table   4 reflect correlation with another performance measure, not a true causal link. To investigate this possibility, column 1 of Table 5 presents results of a logit regression using all the performance variables together. Although none of the performance variables are individually statistically significant, the two variables that depend on the level of earnings-earnings/assets and positive 14 earnings-are jointly significant (p-value = .04, not shown in the table). Collinearity between these two variables seems to be keeping either one from being statistically significant. Columns 2 and 3 confirm this: in multiple regressions omitting one of these two variables, the other is statistically significant. The change in earnings, stock market return, and sales growth are never statistically significant in the multiple regressions in Table 5 . We can conclude that the level of earnings has a robust association with CEO turnover in emerging markets, but we are unable to say whether the probability of a CEO change rises smoothly with lower earnings as monitoring is gradually intensified, whether it rises sharply when negative earnings trigger a jump in monitoring, or both.
Comparing CEO turnover in emerging markets and in the United States
The probability of CEO turnover in emerging markets rises with poor firm performance.
The estimated effects do not seem overwhelmingly large, although statistically they are not zero.
How do they compare with what has been found for the United States? Kaplan (1994) used many of the same measures of firm performance. Using the results reported in Table 4 and Kaplan's reported regression coefficients, we can directly compare the magnitude of the effect of firm performance on CEO turnover for emerging markets with the effect in Kaplan's sample of large U.S. firms. Figure 2 shows how the predicted probability of CEO turnover varies with four of the firm performance measures used in this study and in Kaplan (1994a) . (Kaplan (1994a) did not use earnings/assets.) In these comparisons, the three continuous performance measures-change in earnings, stock market return, and sales growth-are scaled by their respective standard
Kaplan (1994a) regresses CEO turnover on firm performance variables over two-year 14 periods. His regression coefficients cannot be used directly to predict CEO turnover over oneyear period. Let P be the probability of CEO turnover over i years and let X be firm performance i i measured over i years, where i=1,2. To link the one-and two-year variables, assume that P = 2P ! (P ) and X = 2X . If Kaplan's regression is written as P = + X , then Table 2 , column 3 of Kaplan (1994a) . I ignore Kaplan's coefficients on lagged performance since they were statistically insignificant. In Figure 2 , the constant term is chosen so both the emerging markets and U.S. samples have a mean probability of CEO turnover of 12.2 percent. Because Kaplan and I use slightly different definitions of CEO turnover (he excludes turnover due to death or illness while I do not), the mean turnover probability is not comparable across our two samples. (For the record, his mean CEO turnover probability for the U.S. is 10.4 percent.) The constant term shifts the level of the curve in Figure 2 , but this does not matter when comparing the slopes, which is the main idea behind the figure. 15 deviations. Scaling is desirable when comparing developed and emerging markets because there is much more performance variability in emerging markets. Evaluation of a CEO's performance should be done by comparing it with other CEOs' performances. In an environment of greater variability in firm performance, such as that found in emerging markets, greater absolute change in firm performance would likely be needed to induce monitoring of the CEO.
14 The top left graph shows that the effect of falling earnings on the probability of CEO turnover looks quite similar in emerging markets and the United States. (A 95 percent confidence interval on the predicted probability of CEO turnover in emerging markets is marked with a dotted line.) For stock market return, the effect is much weaker in emerging markets than in the U.S., and the difference appears to be statistically significant. (Recall that in Table 4 
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on the predicted probability for emerging markets. Negative earnings increases the probability of CEO turnover in both emerging markets and the U.S. The effect is stronger in the U.S., but again the difference does not appear to be statistically significant. In sum, with the exception of stock market return, the magnitude of the effect of firm performance on the probability of CEO turnover is similar in emerging markets and the United States.
Does the identity of large shareholders matter?
The role of large shareholders in corporate governance has been extensively documented in the literature. In theory, the presence of a large shareholder could have a positive or negative 15 effect on the relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance. On the positive side, a large shareholder may have better monitoring incentives and more monitoring influence than a small shareholder. The large shareholder has a larger amount of wealth at stake, creating a better incentive to monitor. A large shareholder also has more ability to influence the firm's decisionmaking, including the decision to replace the CEO. If having a large shareholder improves monitoring, the relationship between firm performance and CEO turnover should be stronger at firms with a large shareholder. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990) and Kang and Shivdasani (1995) present evidence suggesting that Japanese banks played such a monitoring role in the 1980s (before financial deregulation reduced their power over borrowing firms).
On the negative side, a large shareholder could have other interests besides shareholder value maximization and could insulate managers from outside pressure to let managers pursue Like the data on CEO turnover, the ownership data had to be coded by hand from the 16 old Worldscope CD-ROMs because the Worldscope database does not retain historical data on ownership. Worldscope records the identity of shareholders holding at least 5 percent of the firm's equity. The Worldscope data on ownership may be of a lower quality than the data on CEO turnover and firm performance since the latter are more likely to be subject to mandatory reporting requirements for exchange-listed firms.
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) use 20 percent as the cutoff for their 17 definition of a controlling shareholder. They argue that 20 percent of the votes gives effective control over management's decision-making. compute various cutoffs for their definition of a large shareholder, but their discussion focuses on the results with 20 percent as the cutoff to be comparable with previous literature. Both papers consider indirect as well as direct shareholdings, while I only use direct shareholding data. 17 those other interests. This might be the case if the large shareholder has another relationship with the firm-as a supplier, customer, or manager-and can extract rents from the firm through the other relationship. Or, managers could facilitate direct transfers from minority shareholders to the large shareholder. For example, Chung and Kim (1999) give several stories of large shareholders in Korean companies who bought company assets at a below-market price and resold them for personal profit.
To investigate the role of large shareholders in emerging market corporate governance, I collected data from Worldscope on the identity of a firm's large shareholder(s). I classified 16 firms into four groups according to whether their large shareholder is a domestic firm, a domestic individual or family, a foreigner, or the government. Firms with no large shareholder are collected in a fifth group. A large shareholder is defined as one directly holding at least 20 percent of the firm's equity. I did not trace through indirect ownership chains because of 17 lack of data. Of the 2,663 firm-years in the initial regression, 408 firm-years must be dropped due to missing ownership data and 16 firm-years must be dropped because the firm had more than Another firm-specific characteristic that I investigated, besides the identity of the firm's 18 large shareholder, was whether or not the firm was listed on a developed-country stock exchange. Firms listed on a developed-country exchange have chosen to submit to a stricter regulatory and disclosure regime. They may be better monitored than other firms, which might imply a stronger link between firm performance and CEO turnover. Just over 8 percent of the firms in the sample were listed on a developed-country exchange. However, when I allowed the coefficient on firm performance in the logit regression to differ for these firms, the difference was not statistically significant.
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one large shareholder or a large shareholder that did not fit into one of the categories (i.e., a religious group). Table 6 shows regression results when the effect of earnings/assets on CEO turnover is allowed to vary according to the identity of the firm's large shareholder. At firms whose large shareholder is another domestic firm, the link between earnings/assets and CEO turnover is significantly weaker, compared to firms with no large shareholder. (In fact, for this group the point estimate is zero.) For the remaining shareholder groups, no differences are statistically significant, due perhaps to the small number of firms in those groups. The results are shown using earnings/assets as the performance measure. Similar results obtain when earnings/assets or positive earnings are used as the performance measure; when stock market return or sales growth are used, none of the differences across groups are statistically significant.
Monitoring of corporate managers appears to be weaker in emerging markets when a firm's large shareholder is another domestic firm. Other research has also found that large shareholders have, on net, a negative effect on corporate governance in emerging markets. Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (1999) 
conclude that stock market valuations in nine East
Asian countries in 1996 are lower when large shareholders have control rights out of proportion to their cash flow rights, due to pyramiding and cross-shareholdings. The effect is strongest for firms whose ultimate owner is a family.
Is monitoring weaker in family-controlled firms, as Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (1999) The result that large shareholders weaken corporate governance in emerging markets is striking because, in other times and places, large shareholders have been found to improve corporate governance. Using data on Japan in the 1980s, Kang and Shivdasani (1995) found that firms whose main bank was also a large shareholder had a stronger relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance, suggesting that main banks could improve monitoring. Using data on U.S. firms in the 1980s, Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) found that having a large nonmanagerial shareholder increased the sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance; this result was marginally statistically significant (the p-value of the test was .09).
Does legal origin matter?
La Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999) claim that the different degree of legal protection given shareholders and creditors is the single most important factor explaining differences in corporate governance across countries. In other papers, these authors show that See La Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes, Vishny (1997, 1998). 19 If the link between CEO turnover and firm performance is similar across common and 20 civil law countries, it would only show that corporate governance is not ineffective for firms with public equity. To evaluate the overall performance of the financial system in civil law countries, other factors would be relevant. For example, their relatively weak legal protections for shareholders and creditors lead to smaller debt and equity markets. 20 concentrated ownership is less common and capital markets are more developed in countries with stronger legal protection of shareholders and creditors. They also show that the extent of 19 legal protection of shareholders and creditors is largely determined by whether the country's legal system is based on a common law tradition or a civil law tradition.
Although these papers clearly show that corporate governance mechanisms differ according to legal origin, it is not obvious that corporate governance outcomes must necessarily differ in the same way. On the one hand, strong legal protection of shareholders and concentrated ownership may simply be two different ways to achieve effective corporate governance of firms with publicly-traded equity. According to this argument, the link between CEO turnover and firm performance for publicly-traded firms should not differ across legal origin. On the other hand, the striking differences across countries in the legal protection of shareholders may carry over to corporate governance outcomes. In that case, the link between CEO turnover and firm performance could differ according to legal origin. Investors might be compensated with a higher expected return for investing in countries with poorer corporate governance outcomes.
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To investigate this issue in my dataset, I divided the eight emerging markets in my sample into two groups according to legal origin. Three emerging markets (India, Malaysia, Thailand) are in the common law tradition, and the remaining five (Brazil, Chile, Korea, Mexico, Taiwan) are in the civil law tradition. Summary statistics for the civil law and common law subsamples
In the earlier regressions in this paper, this difference in the mean CEO turnover rate 21 was captured by the country dummies. 21 are shown in Table 7 . The three common law countries account for 61 percent of the firm-years in the sample, reflecting the larger public equity markets in common law countries. The proportion of firm-years with CEO turnover is higher in common law countries. 21 Table 8 shows regression results allowing the effect of firm performance on CEO turnover to differ according to the origin of the legal system in the firm's home country. The only change from Table 4 is that in Table 8 each performance variable is interacted with dummy variables for civil and common law origin. The coefficients and t-statistics on the interaction terms between legal origin and firm performance are reported in the first two columns of Table 8 , and the t-statistics for equality of the two coefficients is reported in the third column.
The three columns of Table 8 lead to three conclusions, only two of which are robust (in a sense described below). The first column suggests that the link between CEO turnover and firm performance is weak in civil law countries; although the point estimates are all negative, the hypothesis that there is no link cannot be rejected. The second column shows that common law countries exhibit a strong link between CEO turnover and performance. For all five performance measures, the logit coefficients for common law countries are more negative than the logit coefficients for all countries pooled (in Table 4 ). In that sense, the common law countries were "driving" the results in Table 4 . The third column shows that the differences between the first two columns are not statistically significant.
The conclusions based on the second and third columns of Table 8 appear to be robust, while the conclusion based on the first column, for civil law countries, is not. To assess
The second and third columns of Table 8 do not change appreciably when doing this 22 robustness check. 22 robustness, I repeated the same robustness check performed earlier: dropping one country at a time from the dataset and re-estimating the regressions to see if the conclusions depend on the particular countries that I chose to include in my sample. When firms in one civil law country (Mexico) are dropped from the dataset, the logit coefficients for civil law countries become much closer in magnitude to the coefficients for common law countries, and for two of the five performance measures they become statistically significantly less than zero (not shown in the table). This finding leads me to the conclusion that the absence of a link between CEO turnover and performance reported in Table 8 for civil law countries is not robust. Also, the lack of 22 statistical significance for civil law countries may be due in part to the smaller sample size (only 39 percent of the dataset are firm-years in civil law countries).
These regressions suggest that, regardless of legal origin, corporate governance is not ineffective for emerging market firms with publicly-listed equity. This is consistent with Kaplan's (1994a Kaplan's ( , 1994b Kaplan's ( , 1997 finding that the link between CEO turnover and firm performance was similar in the United States, a common law country, and Germany and Japan, two civil law countries. One interpretation of these results is that investors are only willing to buy equity in firms with effective corporate governance. Hence, all publicly-listed firms have effective corporate governance regardless of legal origin. The difference between civil and common law countries shows up not in the effectiveness of corporate governance, but in the number of firms that are able to achieve effective corporate governance, and hence the size of equity markets. One of the goals of the paper is to help global investors in emerging markets better understand the nature of the risks they are taking. They may sleep a little better at night knowing that corporate governance in emerging markets is not ineffective. However, the presence of a domestic firm as a large shareholder appears to negate the link between poor performance and CEO turnover. This evidence is consistent with other research suggesting that minority investors in emerging market firms controlled by a large shareholder should be aware that managers may favor the large shareholder at the expense of minority shareholders.
Another goal was to provide some evidence for the debate over the causes of the 1997-98 global financial crisis. Because we found that corporate governance in emerging markets is not ineffective, the results undercut those who argued that structural problems, such as weak corporate governance, were a major factor making emerging markets vulnerable to crisis. This paper has studied corporate governance in emerging markets by examining nonfinancial firms in eight of the largest emerging markets. Two caveats related to the choice of firms are in order. First, by choosing the emerging markets to work with based on data This would be consistent with Stulz (1999) , who argues that corporate governance 23 should improve after a liberalization as domestic firms get more scrutiny from foreign investors. Second, by focusing on the governance of non-financial firms, we give up the possibility of saying anything about bank governance. Bank governance in emerging markets has also been criticized in the wake of the recent financial crisis. Of course, bank governance is heavily influenced by government regulation, which is why it is usually studied separately from corporate governance of non-financial firms.
It is important to keep in mind that these findings do not imply that corporate governance in emerging markets is perfect. This evidence should be viewed as necessary, but not sufficient, for effective corporate governance. Indeed, the results I present may contain some seeds of concern for the future of emerging market corporate governance. The importance of earningsbased measures of performance for emerging markets, compared to stock-market-based measures, is similar to what Kaplan (1994) found for Japan. Events in the 1990s suggest that, while the link between CEO turnover and corporate performance in Japan was broadly similar to that in the U.S. in the 1980s, the Japanese corporate governance system may not be similar to the U.S. system along other dimensions, such as preventing firms in declining industries from overinvesting. Gibson (forthcoming) Results from logit regressions of CEO turnover on firm performance measures for the pooled sample from all eight emerging market countries. In addition to the performance measures, all regressions included a constant term and year, country, and industry dummies, whose coefficients are not reported. The pseudo R is defined as 1 -L/L , where L is the logit regression's log-2 0 likelihood and L is the log-likelihood of a logit regression whose only explanatory variable is a 0 constant. The logit regression goodness-of-fit test is that of Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) , with the data divided into ten groups. It is distributed as . Each regression has 2,162 firm-years. For emerging markets (solid line) and the United States (dashed line), the graphs show the predicted probability of CEO turnover as a function of firm performance. The predictions for emerging markets use the logit regressions reported in Table 4 ; those for the United States use the linear regressions reported in Table 2 , column 3 of Kaplan (1994) . Pointwise 95 percent confidence intervals for the emerging markets predicted probabilities are shown as dotted lines. Figure 2 . Sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance in emerging markets and the United States.
